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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW SURVEY
I. FIRST AMENDMENT - SPEECH CASES
There are three 1991 Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals cases of inter-
est that address First Amendment speech issues. The first, Adolf Coors
Company v. Brady,' involved commercial speech. This appeal arose out
of a suit by Coors against the Secretary of the Treasury and the Director
of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (BATF) in the Colo-
rado District Court, alleging a violation of its First Amendment rights.
Specifically, Coors argued that a federal statute prohibiting Coors from
advertising the alcohol content of its beer was a violation of its right to
free speech. BATF had denied an application by Coors which proposed
to disclose the alcohol content of Coors and Coors Light in its advertis-
ing and labeling.2 BATF based its decision on the language of 27 U.S.C.
§ 205(e) and § 205(f). 3 The district court 4 granted summary judgment
for Coors, holding that the federal statute constituted an illegal restraint
on speech. 5 The district court also enjoined BATF from enforcing the
statute.
The Treasury Department and the House 6 both appealed the dis-
trict court ruling. The court of appeals, 7 in an opinion authored by
Judge Seymour, reversed and remanded the case, holding that there ex-
isted genuine issues of material fact precluding summary judgment on
1. 944 F.2d 1543 (10th Cir. 1991).
2. Id.
3. 27 U.S.C. §§ 205(e) and 205(f) (1988) state in relevant part:
§ 205. Unfair competition and unlawful practices. It shall be unlawful for any
person engaged in business as a distiller, or brewer.., of distilled spirits, wine,
or malt beverages. .. directly or indirectly through an affiliate:
(e) Labeling
To sell or ship or deliver for sale or shipment, or otherwise introduce in
interstate or foreign commerce.., any distilled spirits, wine, or malt beverages in
bottles, unless such products are bottled, packaged, and labeled in conformity
with such regulations, to be prescribed by the Secretary of the Treasury, with
respect to packaging .... labeling and size and fill of container ... (2) as will
provide the consumer with adequate information as to the identity and quality of
the products, the alcohol content thereof (except that statements of, or state-
ments likely to be considered as statements of, alcohol content of malt beverages
are prohibited unless required by State law ....
(f) Advertising
To publish or disseminate.., any advertisement of distilled spirits, wine or
malt beverages.., unless such advertisement is in conformity with such regula-
tions ... (2) as will provide the consumer with adequate information as to the
identity and quality of the products advertised, the alcoholic content thereof (ex-
cept the statements of, or statements likely to be considered as statements of,
alcoholic content of malt beverages and wines are prohibited) ....
4. Zita L. Weinshienk, J.
5. Coors, 944 F.2d at 1543.
6. The United States House of Representatives intervened to defend the constitu-
tionality of the statute after both the Treasury and BATF admitted that the statute was
unconstitutional. Coors 944 F.2d at 1546.
7. Before Circuit Judges McKay, McWilliams, and Seymour.
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Coors' claim that the statute was unconstitutional. 8
The court applied the following four part test from the Supreme
Court opinion in Central Hudson Gas v. Public Ser. Comm'n 9 to determine
whether the commercial speech is protected by the First Amendment: ' 0
For commercial speech to come within the First Amendment, it
at least must concern lawful activity and not be misleading.
Next, it must be determined whether the asserted governmen-
tal interest . .. is substantial. If both inquiries yield positive
answers, it must be determined whether the regulation directly
advances the governmental interest asserted, and whether it is
not more extensive than is necessary to serve that interest."1
Applying the first prong, the court held that Coors' proposal to ad-
vertise alcohol content was commercial speech protected by the First
Amendment.' 2 This was not at variance with the district court's
conclusion.
Under the second prong of the Central Hudson test, contrary to the
district court's holding, the court of appeals held the governmental in-
terest to be legitimate and substantial.' 3 This interest, to protect the
public against the "excesses" by the brewing industry, is supported by
the fact that Coors wanted to advertise a higher alcohol content in order
to "dispel Coors' image of being a "weak beer".'
4
To determine whether the regulation "directly advances" the gov-
ernment's interest in preventing beer strength wars, the court noted that
the "party urging the prohibition on speech has the burden ofjustifying
such a restriction." 15 The court refused to infer that the means directly
advanced the ends simply from the legislature's presumptions.' 6 The
decision points out that the district court erred by not "separately con-
sider[ing] whether the facts presented by both sides presented a genuine
issue of material fact on whether the legislative means directly advanced
the legislative ends."' 7 If, on remand, the district court does conclude
that the interest espoused by Congress is directly advanced by the regu-
lation, the fourth prong of the Central Hudson test, dealing with less in-
trusive means, will then be triggered.
8. Coors, 944 F.2d at 1554.
9. 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
10. Coors v. Brady at 1547.
11. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 557.
12. Coors, 944 F.2d at 1547.
13. Coors, 944 F.2d at 1549. The district court observed that the purpose behind the
legislation is inapplicable to today's market. When the statute was enacted in 1935, Con-
gress was concerned primarily with "strength wars" among breweries. These wars came
about as a result of brewers marketing high alcohol content beers, which consumers would
purchase over the competition. There was a legitimate interest by Congress to encourage
a lower alcohol content of beer. The district court reasoned that factual circumstances had
changed, and the statute no longer serves a substantial interest. Id.
14. Id.
15. Coors, 944 F.2d at 1550 (citing Board of Trustees v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469 (1989) (the
reasoning in this case and the underlying Court of Appeals opinion were relied on heavily
by this court).




Brown v. Palmer 18, presented the issue of whether an Air Force base
had, during their annual open house, intended to create a "public fo-
rum" for speech purposes. During 1985 and 1986 Peterson Air Force
Base celebrated Armed Forces Day by hosting an open house at the
base. The public was invited to the base and various groups distributed
informational materials. 19 Appellee Brown and others sought to dis-
tribute anti-war leaflets, which resulted in bar letters issued by the Air
Force Base. Appellees objected to these letters as restrictions on their
First Amendment right to free speech.20 After appellees received a
judgment in their favor at the district court level, the court of appeals
reversed.21
The court of appeals affirmed its prior decision,2 2 which reversed
the district court.23 The en banc decision held that the Air Force in-
tended to limit political and ideological debate, thereby not creating a
"public forum". 2 4 The bar letters issued to plaintiffs were therefore not
violative of the First Amendment.
25
Appellees presented three arguments on rehearing: (1) that the
"objective" evidence illustrated that Peterson Air Force Base intended
to create a "public forum"; (2) that the court of appeals panel had given
the Air Force Base special status in their determination of whether there
had been a public forum; and (3) that the panel improperly substituted
its judgment for the district court's in holding that the restrictions in
question were viewpoint neutral.
26
The court responded to the first contention, stating that there had
been an objective analysis involved in the determination that Peterson
had not intended to open up their base as a public forum.2 7 The court
examined prior denials by the base of political and ideological re-
quests, 28 and despite the fact that the base had allowed certain religious
activities during the open house, held there was no intent to create a
public forum.
2 9
The court next responded to the argument that the panel had been
operating under the assumption that a military base can never be a pub-
lic forum.3 0 After citing case law holding military bases not to be public
forums, the court stated, "the test is simply whether the government has
intended to open up the facility to public debate on the particular sub-
18. 944 F.2d 732 (10th Cir. 1991).
19. Id. at 737.
20. Id. at 733.
21. Id. at 732.
22. A panel of the court previously held that Peterson Air Force Base was not a public
forum during the open houses held in 1985 and 1986. Brown v. Palmer, 915 F.2d 1435
(10th Cir. 1990).
23. Brown 944 F.2d at 732.
24. Id. at 733.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 736-37.
28. Id. at 736.
29. Id. at 737.
30. Id. at 738.
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DENVER UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW
ject matter sought to be addressed by the person seeking access to that
government facility. '"3 1 The court was careful to point out that the evi-
dence must unequivocally support that the Air Force Base intended to
abandon control over conduct or speech in order for it to be perceived
as a public forum.3 2 This stringent test has rarely led a court to deter-
mine that a military base is an open forum. Although the court vehe-
mently denied giving the military base special status, it did acknowledge
the special needs of the military to maintain security and avoid political
and ideological debate.33 The court did not address the contention that
the panel improperly substituted its judgment for that of the district
court.
The majority was met by a strong dissent authored by John P.
Moore, CircuitJudge, joined by Holloway, ChiefJudge, and McKay and
Seymour, Circuit Judges.3 4 Criticizing how the majority viewed the evi-
dence, the dissent argued that what the Air Force did allow on the base,
as opposed to what they prohibited, is a better indicator of whether
there was intent to create a public forum.3 5 Because the base had been
opened for certain activities, it should be considered a public forum for
all activities.
The court of appeals in Miles v. Denver Public SchoolS, 3 6 addressed the
question of whether a teacher's in-class statements are constitutionally
protected. Appellant sought damages and injunctive relief pursuant to
42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the district court, which in turn granted summary
judgment in favor of the defendant school system.3 7 Statements made
by Miles during a ninth grade government class resulted in a four day
paid administrative leave and a letter of reprimand which stated, "you
will need to refrain from commenting on any items which might reflect
negatively on individual members of our student body." 3 8 Appellant
Miles asserted that his in-class statements3 9 were constitutionally pro-
tected, and that the school's letter of reprimand "chilled" and violated
his First Amendment right to free speech and expression. 40
The court of appeals applied the test from Mount Healthy City School
31. Id. at 739.
32. Id. (citing Flower v. United States, 407 U.S. 197 (1972)).
33. Id. [T]he court voiced concerns regarding the policy ramifications of accepting the
appellee's position, "T]he flow of information to the public from Peterson Air Force Base
would likely be restricted. The military, most likely, could not risk the possibility that
Peterson AFB would be labeled as a public forum .... [hence] the public would lose the
opportunity to come onto military bases; to learn about the weapon systems .... and then
to take that information back out to the public fora that are available and there to debate, if
they wish, the proper role of the military." Id. at 739-40.
34. Id. at 740.
35. Id.
36. 944 F.2d 773 (10th Cir. 1991).
37. Id. at 744.
38. Id.
39. Miles had commented to his ninth grade government class on the declining qual-
ity of the school, citing as an example an unfounded rumor that two students had been
seen on the school grounds having sexual intercourse. Id. at 773-74.
40. Id. at 775.
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District Board of Education v.Doyle4 l in order to determine whether a pub-
lic employee's First Amendment rights have been violated by an adverse
employment decision.4 2 First, the employee must show that "the speech
for which he was disciplined was constitutionally protected and [sec-
ondly], the protected speech motivated the adverse employment deci-
sion."'43 Once the employee has met this burden, the employer must
show by a preponderance of the evidence that it would have made the
same decision absent the protected speech.
44
As in Brown v. Palmer, the court initially examined whether the
school was a public forum.4 5 The court concluded that there was no
evidence that the school had intended to open up the school grounds as
a public forum, and hence the speech was not protected. 4 6 The court
found that the school had put forth legitimate pedagogical interests and
its actions were legitimately related to those interests.4 7 Because the
appellant neither showed that his in-class comments were constitution-
ally protected nor raised any evidence to dispute that the school's inter-
ests were legitimate and related to the ends, judgment for the school
was affirmed.
4 8
This case is remarkable due to the court's choice of standards. It
chose to apply the test set forth in Hazelwood as opposed to the standard
set forth in Pickering v. Board of Education.4 9 The Pickering decision bal-
ances the interests of the state (employer) in preventing certain expres-
sion in the workplace against the employee's interest in making the
statements. 50 The court reasoned that this test is not applicable where
the state is an educator.51 In such an instance the more stringent test
from Hazelwood better serves the purposes of reviewing speech in the
classroom context.52 The court also noted, in response to Miles' argu-
ment, that a secondary teacher does not enjoy the academic freedom
accorded by the Supreme Court to those in a University setting.5 3
II. FIRST AMENDMENT - RELIGION
In 1991, the Tenth Circuit addressed a number of cases involving
First Amendment religion clause claims by prisoners. The court consist-
ently applied the test set forth in Turner v. Safely, 5 4 which provides four
41. 429 U.S. 274 (1977).
42. Miles, 944 F.2d at 775.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 776.
46. The court relied heavily on the analysis set forth in Hazelwood School District v.
Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
47. Miles, 944 F.2d at 778.
48. Id. at 779.
49. 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
50. Miles, 944 F.2d at 777; see also Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378 (1987); Connick
v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983).
51. 944 F.2d at 777.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 779.
54. 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987).
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factors to assist in determining whether a prison regulation has imper-
missibly impinged upon an inmate's Constitutional rights.
First, there must be a valid, rational connection between the
prison regulation and the legitimate governmental interest put
forward to justify it .... A second factor ... is whether there
are alternative means of exercising the right that remain open
to prison inmates .... A third consideration is the impact ac-
commodation of the asserted constitutional right will have on
guards and other inmates, and on the allocation of prison re-
sources generally .... Finally, the absence of ready alternatives
is evidence of the reasonableness of a prison regulation.5 5
The Tenth Circuit, in Clifton v. Craig5 6 and Hall v. Bellmon 5 7 applied
these standards in holding for prison facilities. Clifton affirmed the dis-
trict court's grant of summary judgment for Leavenworth Federal Peni-
tentiary. 58 Clifton, a pro se appellant, brought an action against a
chaplain for the Federal Bureau of Prisons, objecting to the restrictions
imposed upon the members of the Church of Christ. 59 Specifically, Clif-
ton was not permitted to hold Sunday services for his denomination
apart from other groups of worshippers. 60 The court applied the four
part Turner inquiry to conclude that the restriction on Clifton's religious
practice was a reasonable one.6 1 Similarly, in Hall v. Bellmon, the court
recited the four Turner factors in holding that the cutting of Appellant's
hair and confiscation of his medicine bag and talisman were reasonably
related to legitimate penological interests. Thus, the court affirmed the
district court's 12(b)(6) dismissal of plaintiff's claims. 62 Both of these
opinions give a great deal of deference to prison officials. 63 The only
allowances the court of appeals appeared to make for inmates is in situa-
tions in which the district court fails to apply the Turner factors at all.
Mosier v. Maynard" is such a case. Mosier involved the denial of an
exception to the prison grooming standards. Plaintiff was seeking an
exception based on his Native American religion. The Oklahoma insti-
tution had a policy in effect that would deny such an application unless
the prisoner could prove through outside sources that he sincerely ad-
55. Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1113 (10th Cir. 1991) (quoted in Turner v.
Safely, 482 U.S.-78, 89-90 (1987)(citations omitted)).
56. 924 F.2d 182 (10th Cir.1991)(before Anderson, Tacha, and Brorby, Circuit
Judges).
57. 935 F.2d 1106 (10th Cir. 1991)(before Logan, Moore and Baldock, Circuit
Judges).
58. Clifton, 924 F.2d at 183.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 184.
62. Hall, 935 F.2d at 1114. (It should be noted that the court primarily focused on the
question of whether a Martinez report is proper to develop the record and to consider for
the purposes of a 12(b)(6) motion, which it answered in the affirmative).
63. Citon, 924 F.2d at 184. ("This standard gives corrections officials the necessary
leeway to effectively confront the intractable difficulties of administering prison systems
while, at the same time, it keeps the intrusion of the judiciary into such matters at a mini-
mum." Id. (citing O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 349-50 (1987))).
64. 937 F.2d 1521 (10th Cir. 1991)(before Logan, Moore, and Baldock, Circuit
Judges).
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heres to such religion. 6 5 Because the Plaintiff refused to supply the
prison official with supporting evidence,66 the official refused to grant
the exception.
67
The district court granted summary judgment for the institution,
holding the grooming regulation valid and Plaintiff unqualified for an
exception without referring to the Turner factors.68 The Tenth Circuit,
in an opinion written by Judge Baldock, reversed and remanded, articu-
lating the necessity of applying the four Turner factors. The court stated
that the question of whether religious beliefs are sincerely held is a ques-
tion of fact,6 9 which the district court should resolve after further in-
quiry and application of the Turner factors.
7 0
The Tenth Circuit in McKinney v. Maynard,7 1 reiterated the impor-
tance of the Turner factors. The district court dismissed McKinney's
complaint as frivolous,7 2 which alleged a violation of his First Amend-
ment right to practice his Native American religion by the state (prison
officials)7 3 . The Tenth Circuit stated that plaintiff's complaint did con-
tain " 'an arguable basis either in law or in fact,' 74 and therefore va-
cated the dismissal and remanded the case to the district court for
consideration in light of the Turner factors.7 5 The court added, "[w]hile
legitimate penological objectives remain in the balance, those interests
do not categorically negate the mettle of Mr. McKinney's First Amend-
ment claim."
76
65. The prison required the inmate to establish that: "(1) the religion is recognized;
(2) he is an adherent to the religion; (3) the practice of his religion is inhibited by a partic-
ular provision in the grooming code; and (4) the facility's interest in security does not
outweigh his need to practice the religion." Id. at 1522.
66. The Plaintiff refused to identify non family members who would vouch for the
sincerity of his beliefs. Mosier, 937 F.2d at 1526.
67. Id. at 1523.
68. The district court relied on Sixth Circuit law holding that a prison could enforce a
blanket restriction on hair length even if it conflicted with sincere Native American beliefs.
See Pollack v. Marshall, 845 F.2d 656, 657, 659-60 (6th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 987
(1988).
69. The court noted that the plaintiff had presented probative evidence of his reli-
gious beliefs in his compliant, which can be treated as an affidavit. Mosier, 937 F.2d at 1524
(citing Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1111 (10th Cir. 1991)).
70. Mosier, 937 F.2d at 1527.
71. 952 F.2d 350 (before Moore and Tacha, CircuitJudges, and Kane, DistrictJudge,
sitting by designation).
72. Id. at 351. The district court dismissed the complaint as frivolous under 28 U.S.C.
sec 1915(d).
73. Specifically, plaintiff sought damages and injunctive relief to prohibit prison au-
thorities from enforcing the grooming code against him, to have his medicine bag re-
turned,and to permit the construction of a sweat lodge at the facility. McKinney, 352 F.2d
at 351-52.
74. Id. (quoting Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989)).
75. Id. at 353.
76. Id. at 354.
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III. PROPERTY RIGHTS
A. Employment
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals held in Russillo v. Scarborough 77
that an "at will" employee has no property interest in the manner of
their termination. 78 Plaintiff appealed the district court ruling that he
did not have a constitutionally protected property interest in his job79
on the novel theory that he had a property interest in the expectation
that he could only be terminated by his immediate employer. 80 Plain-
tiff's suit for wrongful termination followed his dismissal from the posi-
tion of court administrator as a result of "lax procedures" and the theft
of $29,000.00.81 The court stated that a property interest cannot be had
in the methods by which it is deprived.
8 2
The court cited Campbell v. Mercer,8 3 which held that a property in-
terest is defined by substantive restrictions,8 4 not procedural protec-
tions.8 5 Employees cannot have a property interest in the procedures
involved in their termination, because" 'such a right attaches only when
there are substantive restrictions on the employer's discretion.' "86
B. Fifth Amendment - Takings
The Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides
that private property shall not be taken for public use without just com-
pensation. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals in Sangre de Cristo Devel-
opment Co.,Inc. v. United States8 7 held that the Department of Interior's
(DOI) recision of its approval of a lease of Indian land did not constitute
a taking.8 8 Appellant, Sangre de Cristo Development Co., had their
lease of 5,000 acres of Indian land approved by the U.S. Department of
77. 935 F.2d 1167 (10th Cir. 1991)(before Moore and Brorby, Circuit Judges, and
Van Bebber, District Judge, United States District Court for District of Kansas, sitting by
designation).
78. New Mexico law provides that a public employee has a protected property interest
if they have an implied or express right to continued employment. This is distinguishable
from "at will" status, which does not give the employee a legitimate expectation of contin-
ued employment. Id. at 1170 (citing Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341 (1976)).
79. Id. at 1170.
80. Russillo was employed by the metropolitan court, but was terminated by the New
Mexico Supreme Court. Id. at 1170.
81. Id. at 1169-70. According to defendant Justice Scarborough, plaintiffwas not ac-
cused of stealing the money.
82. Id. at 1170 (relying on Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532
(1985)).
83. 926 F.2d 990 (10th Cir. 1991)(before Holloway, Chief Judge, Baldock, Circuit
Judge, and Greene, DistrictJudge, United States District Court for District of Utah, sitting
by designation).
84. State law defines what substantive property rights employees have in their em-
ployment. Campbell, 926 F.2d at 992 (citing Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564
(1972)).
85. Campbell, 926 F.2d at 993.
86. Id. at 993 (quoting Asbill v. Housing Authority of Choctaw Nation, 726 F.2d 1499,
1502 (10th Cir. 1984)(emphasis added)).
87. 932 F.2d 891 (10th Cir. 1991)(before Logan, Anderson, and Ebel, CircuitJudges).
88. Id. at 895.
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the Interior. Their hopes of developing the area into a residential com-
munity and golf course were dashed by DOI's subsequent recission of
their prior approval.8 9 In order to prevail on a takings claim, a plaintiff
must first prove there is a vested interest protected by the Fifth Amend-
ment that was present at the time the taking occurred, and second, that
the government's action was a taking under the Fifth Amendment. 90
Affirming the district court's dismissal of the Fifth Amendment tak-
ings claim, the court of appeals did not address the second prong as they
found there was not a protected interest in the lease at the time of the
recision.9 1 The court reasoned that the lease of the Indian land is only
valid if approved by the Department of the Interior.92 The recision by
the Department was subsequent to a finding by this court that the prior
approval was invalid.9 3 Because the approval was invalid, plaintiff's in-
terest had never vested, making a taking impossible.
The Tenth Circuit also affirmed the dismissal of a Fifth Amendment
takings claim in Miller v. Campbell County9 4 as not ripe for review.9 5
Plaintiffs claimed an excavation order given by the County Commission-
ers due to the discovery of methane and hydrogen gases seeping up
through the ground constituted a "taking" of their homes for which ade-
quate compensation should be given.96 Because the plaintiffs had a re-
verse condemnation action pending in state court to recover
compensation for their loss, an action for taking without just compensa-
tion was unwarranted.9 7 The court also addressed the plaintiff's Four-
teenth Amendment Due Process claim by refusing to impose additional
due process obligations upon parties when the Fifth Amendment takings
clause adequately addresses the issue.98
Kimberley A. Elting
89. Id. at 893.
90. Id. at 894.
91. Id.
92. Id. (citing 25 U.S.C. § 415(a) (1970)).
93. Davis v. Morton, 469 F.2d 593, 597 (10th Cir. 1972)(The court of appeals held
that the approval of the lease required an Environmental Impact Statement under NEPA
sec. 4332(2)(C), which the Department had failed to complete).
94. 945 F.2d 348 (10th Cir. 1991).
95. Id. at 350.
96. Id. at 352.
97. Id. at 351.
98. Id. at 352.
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